Banality of Evil and Metaphysical Fallacy : A Preliminary Study on Arendt’s Dismantling of Metaphysics by 小石川  和永 & Kazue KOISHIKAWA
Banality of Evil and Metaphysical Fallacy : A
Preliminary Study on Arendt’s Dismantling of
Metaphysics
著者（英） Kazue KOISHIKAWA
journal or
publication title
Studies In Philosphy
volume 45
page range 134(117)-106(145)
year 2020-03-28
URL http://doi.org/10.15068/00159946
Banality of Evil and Metaphysical Fallacy: A Preliminary Study on Arendt’s Dismantling of Metaphysics
117
Thoughtlessness and Question on Thinking
　　Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) had been working on a book manuscript dealing with three 
human mental activities, viz., thinking, willing, and judgment.  What would have been con-
sisted in the third part̶Judgment̶was never written and thus her final project was left un-
finished due to her untimely death.  The first two parts̶Thinking and Willing̶were put to-
gether and published posthumously as The Life of the Mind (1977).1  In order to fill the missing 
part, i.e., “Judgment,” a series of her lecture notes on Kant’s aesthetic judgment given at the 
New School in 1970 was published in 1982.2  Nevertheless, it must be said that Arendt’s last 
project on those three human mental activities has been largely neglected by among Arendt 
scholars comparing from her earlier works such as The Origin of Totalitarianism (1952), The 
Human Condition (1958), Between Past and Future (1961).3  Indeed with a few exceptions, 
there are questioned never raised seriously: “Where Arendt’s last works on those mental ac-
tivities should be positioned within her oeuvre?”  “Is there any theoretical continuity between 
her earlier works and those belong to her unfinished project, and if so on what account?” 
Or, “What was Arendt’s intention to tackle with exploring those mental activities for the first 
place?”  It seems that those questions are particularly relevant when it comes to Arendt’s 
exploration on the “thinking” in LM I for two reasons: 1) Unlike “willing” and “judgment,” in 
which direct thematic relatedness can be detected with Arendt’s earlier writings concerning 
to “action,” whereas “thinking” seems not to have such connectedness to “action” but rather 
gives an impression that there are some distances in terms of its thematic continuity with 
“action.”  
　　One thing is clear that it was her encounter with Adolf Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem 
that made her take up the topic: “What is thinking?”4  That encounter and her subsequent 
report on him would fuel much controversy due to her use of the phrase “the banality of evil,” 
caused her to reflect upon the relation between “thinking” and “judgment.”  Eichmann was 
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not stupid but “thoughtless.”5  Arendt thinks that his thoughtlessness, or, the “absence of 
thinking,” enabled him to follow the order to transport Jews as efficiently as possible to the 
extermination camps without ever feeling guilty or responsible for their fate.6
　　Based on her observation of Eichmann at his trial, Arendt wonders if there is a correla-
tion between thinking and moral judgment: She wondered if thinking is one of the conditions 
for us to make a moral judgment.7  However, it is the least to say that any readers of the work 
would be puzzled that if the link between thinking and moral judgment is actually at stake with 
respect to the thematic development in the work.  Though Arendt’s thesis seems to be clear; 
reexamining our faculty of thinking, yet neither her method nor her true purpose of it is some-
what hidden in LM: I.  It is almost at the end of the last section̶section 20̶finally Arendt 
alludes what she has done in that work was “dismantling of metaphysics.”8  
　　The purpose of this paper is to point out that when Arendt says “dismantling of metaphys-
ics,” what she has in her mind is to deconstruct Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in order 
for her to lay the ethical moral ground in thinking based on human plurality.  Since to uncover 
the whole structure of Arendt’s “dismantling” is by far beyond the scope of this paper, the 
paper withholds itself merely sketching out some of the key components.  The paper consists 
of four sections.  First, it analyzes how Arendt gives an account of perception as intersubjec-
tivity based on plurality, which has its root in phenomenological legacy. The second section 
provides a close analysis of the origin of what Arendt calls “metaphysical fallacy” in the 6th sec-
tion of LM: I where Kant’s account of the “thinking ego” is criticized by Arendt.  The analysis 
makes it clear that Arendt takes a position that the “thinking ego” is not same as the “self,” in 
which we can detect her aim of “dismantling of metaphysics.”  The third section provides fur-
ther analysis on the “metaphysical fallacy” in the 18th section of LM: I.  It exhibits that the true 
target of Arendt’s criticism aims not on Kant’s account of the “thinking ego” but Heidegger’s 
account of the “self.”  Lastly, the fourth section suggests that it is in Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Kant’s transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) where the 
key to understand what Arendt intends to articulate the issue of the “metaphysical fallacy” in 
terms of finding positive linkage between thinking and judgment.  
I.  Being is Appearing: Arendt’s account of perception
　　There is a twofold thesis in LM:I, which is expressed explicitly as follows: first, Arendt 
claims the “absolute primacy of the world of appearances” over and against the traditional 
5　 Ibid., 4.
6　 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1963), 25.
7　 LM:I, 4-5.
8　 Arendt wrote, “I have clearly joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been attempting to 
dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories, as we have known them from their beginning 
in Greece until today.”  Ibid., 212.
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metaphysical two-worlds theory, which views appearance as the mere semblance of Being; 
she calls the latter the “metaphysical fallacy.”9 In contrast, Arendt proclaims that “Being and 
Appearing coincide.”10  Second, Arendt posits that the origin of this “metaphysical fallacy” 
by and large arises when philosophers demand the “kind of results and apply the kind of 
criteria for certainty and evidence that are the results and the criteria of cognition” to rea-
son.11  It means that the origin of “metaphysical fallacy” is the interpretation of thinking activity 
through the application to it of the model of perception.  Or, more precisely, those who com-
mit a “metaphysical fallacy” tend to forget that thinking is, really, “after-thought,” arising once 
perception ceases.12  Instead, they often treat thinking and knowing (perception) as being the 
same, which leads to the giving of a superior ontological status to the idea (the thought object) 
as the substratum of appearance.  As a result, the dichotomy of Being and being is introduced. 
Arendt points out that this is due to the distinction between reason (Vernunft) and intellect 
(Verstand) introduced by Kant, which made a decisive impact on subsequent philosophy, par-
ticularly on German Idealism.  In short, Arendt notes the origin of the “metaphysical fallacy” in 
the speculative thinking by professional thinkers who interpret the experience of the thinking 
ego on the cognitive model and apply it to reason.13  
　　Let us start with the first point.  Arendt posits the absolute primacy of the world of ap-
pearances over and against metaphysical world order where appearance is taken as mere sem-
blance of Being.  Arendt objects the idea of Being as the substratum of appearance but rather 
insists that in the world of appearance “Being and Appearing coincide.”14  However, if we pay 
attention closely, we notice the issue that Arendt raises in the text is much more complicated 
and goes deeper.  The issue at stake is Arendt’s account of the relation between appearance 
and human existence.  To make this point clear, first we need to give close attention to the rela-
tion between appearance and plurality.
In this world which we enter, appearing from a nowhere, and from which we disappear 
into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide.̶Nothing and nobody exists in this world 
whose very being does not presuppose a spectator.  In other words, nothing that is, in-
sofar as it appears, exists in the singular; everything that is is meant to be perceived by 
somebody.  Not Man but men inhabit this planet.  Plurality is the law of the earth.15 
9　 LM:I, 12.
10　 Ibid., 19.
11　 Ibid., 15.
12　 Ibid., 87.
13　 We have to note that it is Kant who introduced the distinction between reason and intellect and “made room 
for thought.”  According to Arendt, as a result, he opens the door for the “metaphysical fallacy.”  At first 
glance, Arendt’s criticism for “metaphysical fallacy” seems to be addressed to Kant.  However, as we shall 
demonstrate in the last section of this paper, the real target of her criticism is not Kant but Heidegger, or, 
more precisely, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, Ibid., 14.
14　 Ibid., 19.
15　 Ibid., 19.  Emphasis added.
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To appear presupposes that there is at least a spectator to perceive her appearing.16  Without 
this spectator, there is no appearance.  When someone appears, this implies that her appearing 
is to appear to the eyes of another.  To be, particularly for us, as human beings in our context, is 
same as to appear, and to appear is to exist.  And since every appearance already presupposes a 
spectator, human existence is always embedded in plurality.  It is in this sense that “plurality is 
the law of the earth,” for it is the very condition of appearance.  And it is in her proclamation, 
“Being and Appearing coincide,” that we can first detect that her explicit twofold thesis em-
braces her implicit thesis in the text, i.e., the issue of human existence.  If “Being and Appearing 
coincide” in the world of appearances and “to appear” means “to exist” for us as she claims, the 
objective reality of our perception rests in human plurality.  We are not just in the world but of 
the world and as such we are both subjects and objects̶“perceiving and being perceived”̶at 
the same time.17  It is in this relation between perception and human existence that we can point 
out that not only Arendt’s account of appearance is perception, but such account suggests her 
theoretical understanding of perception is fundamentally intersubjective.   
　　In fact, our suggestion seems to be supported when Arendt refers to Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality for explaining her account of appearance.   
Husserl’s basic and greatest discovery takes up in exhaustive detail the intentionality of 
all acts of consciousness, that is the fact that no subjective act is ever without an object(.) 
Objectivity is built into the very subjectivity of consciousness by virtue of intentionality. 
Conversely and with the same justness, one may speak of the intentionality of appear-
ances and their built-in subjectivity.  All objects because they appear indicate a subject, 
and, just as every subjective act has its intentional object, so every appearing object has 
its intentional subject.̶ Whatever appears is meant for a perceiver, a potential subject 
no less inherent in all objectivity than a potential object is inherent in the subjectivity of 
every intentional act.̶[O]ur certainty that what we perceive has an existence indepen-
dent of the act of perceiving, depends entirely on the object’s also appearing as such to 
others and being acknowledged by them.  Without this tacit acknowledgment by others 
we would not even be able to put faith in the way we appear to ourselves.18
　　Arendt agrees with Husserl that “objectivity is built into the very subjectivity of con-
sciousness by virtue of intentionality.”  So, what appears indicates a perceiving subject, which 
means that every appearing object has its intentional subject and every intending subject has 
intended object.  In other words, in the phenomenon of appearance, the fact that something 
appears means that, in its appearance, both a “potential subject” and a “potential object” are 
inherent.  However, the certainty of the perceived object, viz., its existence, depends on the 
acknowledgement of others.  That is, the very object I perceive is also perceived by them.  
　　Arendt’s contention is to point out that the certainty of existence̶both of subject and 
16　 Though here Arendt says “a spectator” in the third line in the quotation, we should remember that the 
spectator is plural for Arendt.  See Ibid., 96.
17　 Ibid., 20, emphasis added.
18　 Ibid., 46, emphasis added.
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object, cannot be derived from the intentionality of the act of consciousness as long as the 
relation between intentio and intentum is separated from acknowledgement of others, since 
the relation between the two in the act of consciousness, which is put in a bracket, is not a 
cognitive activity but is derived from a thinking reflection about the cognitive activity.  For that 
reason, her objection goes beyond Husserl and is extended to Descartes.  
“[I]t never occurred to him [Descartes] that no cogitatio and no cogito me cogitare, no 
consciousness of an acting self that had suspended all faith in the reality of its intentional 
objects, would ever have been able to convince him of his own reality had he actually been 
born in a desert, without a body and its senses to perceive ‘material’ things and without 
fellow-creatures to assure him that what he perceived was perceived by them too.” 19  
My thinking may be real and so as the I as the thinking ego in the I-think is presupposed in 
that activity, yet thought can “neither prove nor disprove it.”20  In other words, in the solipsistic 
thinking, certainty of thinking cannot provide the certainty of existence.
　　Against the philosophical view to take certainty of thinking as that of existence, which 
Arendt posits as a fallacy, she claims that the reality of the world of appearances consists of the 
mode of the “it-seems-to-me,” or, dokei moi.21  That “seeming” reflects the fact that everyone 
sees things from different places where they stand, just like different spectators see the actor 
on the stage from different seats.22  She writes:  “Seeming corresponds to the fact that every 
appearance, its identity notwithstanding, is perceived by a plurality of spectators.”23  Because 
each one of us dwells in a particular place in the world, each perspective alone merely ex-
presses “it-seems-to-me.”  The objectivity of things that I see from my perspective gains its ob-
jectivity when others acknowledge by responding, “Yes, it-seems-to-me too.” Naturally, then, 
the more people who acknowledge to me what I see, the more reality my perception gains. 
Our sense of reality depends on the plurality of perspectives whose other name is “the world 
of appearances”.  “The subjectivity of the it-seems-to-me is remedied by the fact that the same 
object also appears to others though its mode of appearance may be different.” 24 
II.  The origin of metaphysical fallacy
　　Now, let us go over the second thesis; the issue of the “metaphysical fallacy.” Arendt finds 
that the liberation of reason from cognition is the origin of metaphysical fallacies.  More spe-
cifically, Arendt considers that the metaphysical fallacies are derived from those professional 
19　 Ibid., 48.
20　 Ibid., 49.
21　 Ibid., 21.
22　 “To appear always means to seem to others, and this seeming varies according to the standpoint and the 
perspective of the spectators.” Ibid.
23　 Ibid.
24　 Ibid., 50.
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thinkers’ interpretation of reason from the viewpoint of the experience of the thinking ego. 
That is, those fallacies arise through applying the “kind of criteria and certainty and evidence 
that are results and the criteria of cognition” to the activity of reason, viz., thinking.25   
　　Arendt finds the origin of the “metaphysical fallacy” in Kant’s distinction between reason 
(Vernunft) and intellect (Verstand) introduced by Kant.  Arendt claims that these two concepts 
refer to “altogether different mental activities.”26  While reason is the activity of thinking, in-
tellect is that of knowing.27  The former is concerned with meaning, whereas the latter is 
concerned with cognition.  Kant himself thinks that, while we cannot know of God,  freedom 
and immortality, we also cannot help thinking about them, and thus he “justified reason’s 
need to think beyond the limits of what can be known.”28  Though Kant thinks that in doing so 
he makes room for faith, Arendt points out what he does is only to separate knowledge from 
thinking and thus to make room for thought instead.29  Arendt’s core claim is that meaning and 
truth are not the same and neither are their designated mental activities.  The “metaphysical 
fallacy” arises when professional thinkers who follow Kant want to find the basis of certainty in 
the activity of thinking itself.  The basic fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysi-
cal fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model of truth.”30  
　　According to Arendt, “[c]ognition, whose highest criterion is truth, derives that criterion 
from the world of appearances in which we take our bearings through sense perceptions, 
whose testimony is self-evident,” whereas that is not the case for meaning and its faculty, viz., 
reason.31  Reason is unconcerned about the existence of the object, for object is always taken for 
granted.  Rather, it is concerned with what it means for that object to be.32  The desire to know 
by intellect is always answerable by “common-sense experience and common-sense reason-
ing”; while these may make errors, like perception, it can be corrected for the same reason. 
However, the desire for the “quest for meaning,” is endless, for the question raised by reason 
is unanswerable.  To illustrate her point, Arendt quotes a verse from W.H. Auden:
Unpredictably, decades ago, You arrived
Among that unending cascade of creatures spewed from Nature’s maw.  
25　 Ibid., 15.
26　 Ibid., 14.
27　 Ibid.
28　 Ibid.
29　 Ibid.
30　 Ibid. Arendt continues to point out that that distinction has an “extraordinary liberating effect on German 
philosophy, touching off the rise of German idealism” which makes room for “speculative thought.”  For 
our purposes, it should be specifically emphasized that Arendt mentions Heidegger in this regard that he 
starts out “by raising anew the question of the meaning” of Being in Being and Time, and also in his later 
interpretation of his own initial question he explicitly says, “Meaning and Being” and “Truth and Being” 
are the same.  See, Ibid., 15.
31　 Ibid. 57, emphasis added.
32　 Ibid.
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A random event, says Science.
Random my bottom! A true miracle, say I,
For who is not certain that he was meant to be?33 
The birth of someone is just a random event in nature, as seen from the viewpoint of science. 
Yet, it is felt by that person that his existence is real and he was “meant to be.”  However, Arendt 
comments that that “being ‘meant to be’ is not a truth” but “a highly meaningful proposition.”34 
There is no way to know if he was “meant to be,” and thus to ask this question is not the role 
of intellect but that of the reason of what it means for him to be.  In asking and answering that 
question, the person would think about the meaning of his life either for himself or for nature 
as a whole, or for both.  What is clear regardless is that there is no clear and fixed answer to 
that question.  Arendt says, “To expect truth to come from thinking signifies that we mistake 
the need to think with the urge to know.”35  Even though “the proposition that everybody who 
is ‘was meant to be’ can easily refuted,” the reason why the certainty of the I “was meant to 
be” survives such refutation is that the “feeling of certainty” that the I-am is “inherent in every 
thinking reflection,” according to Arendt.36  On the contrary, from the viewpoint of common 
sense and what she calls “common-sense reasoning,” the quest for meaning is “meaningless,” 
because “it is the six sense’s function to fit us into the world of appearances and make us at 
home in the world given by our five senses; there we are and no questions asked.”37  It is an-
other way to describe that we human beings are beings of the world of appearances in which 
our existence is determined.  In other words, the “quest for meaning” is said to be “meaning-
less” raised by reason, for human existence means that we are always already being of a part 
of the meaningful context.  The context is already given thereby or, our existence is already 
contextualized.  If the “quest for meaning” is “meaningful,” that is so only when the “meaning” 
is sought within that context, not apart from it.  But that is not how the “quest of meaning” 
is pursued by the philosophers, and that is precisely what Arendt is trying to point out here. 
“Thinking can and must be employed in the attempt to know, but in the exercise of this func-
tion it is never itself; it is but the handmaiden of an altogether different enterprise.”38  That “all 
together different enterprise” is metaphysics.  
　　Arendt emphasizes repeatedly that truth and meaning are not the same.39  However it 
does not mean that Arendt denies the close affinity between reason and intellect.  Quite the 
contrary: She presumes that it is reason’s appetite for meaning and its desire to ask unanswer-
33　 W. H. Auden, “Talking to myself,” in Collected Poems (Random House, 1976), 653.  Appeared in Ibid., 60-61.
34　 Ibid., 61.
35　 Ibid., emphasis added.
36　 Ibid., emphasis added.
37　 Ibid., 59.
38　 Ibid., 61.
39　 Or, we should say that the distinction between truth and meaning is derived from the distinction between 
intellect and reason, from Arendt’s point of view.  For Arendt, truth is perceptual truth and the meaning of 
such truth is derived from reflecting on what happened, i.e., from the historical understanding.
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able questions, i.e., the most primordial sense of wonder.40  The problem arises due to the keen 
affinity between the two different mental capacities, and the philosophers’ tendency to apply 
the criterion of truth to their own rather extraordinary business, i.e., thinking activity.41  And it 
is in this sense that Kant’ is no exception.42  In spite of that his “famous distinction between 
Vernunft and Verstand, between a faculty of speculative thought and the ability to know arising 
out of sense experience,” he could not part altogether with the conviction that the final aim 
of thinking, as of knowledge, is truth and cognition.”43  That discussion is carried to LM: I, 6, 
“The thinking ego and the self: Kant.” As the title of the section suggests, the overview of LM: 
I, 6 is to examine the relationship between the thinking ego and the self, which Arendt finds in 
Kant’s “I think.”  Arendt launches this section by pointing out the role that Kant’s notion of the 
“thing in itself” (transcendental object) plays in his noumena/phenomena distinction.  That is, 
his notion of “thing in itself” allows him to treat appearance as “mere representation.”44  
　　Let us start with the text of LM: I that begins toward the end of page 42 and extends to 
the beginning of the following page. Here, Arendt posits that “thinking is not the self,” which 
seems to be her main contention in this chapter.45   Arendt says, 
If I reflect on the relation of me to myself obtaining in the thinking activity, it may well 
seem as though my thought were ‘mere representations’ or manifestations of an ego that 
itself remains forever concealed, for thoughts of course are never anything like proper-
ties that can be predicated of a self or a person.46  
　　According to Arendt, the “thinking ego is not the self,” for neither it appears to others 
nor to itself as “the self of self-awareness.”47   And yet the thinking ego is “not nothing.”48  The 
thinking ego as “not nothing” causes a “metaphysical fallacy,” for it plays a role as “thing in 
itself” upon which appearance is grounded and makes appearance as “mere representation.”49 
Arendt points out that the thinking ego cannot be the self but is a “sheer activity” that lacks “a 
life” story, unlike the self.50   
We can follow where her claim comes from in the next page.  
The inner sense that might let us get hold of the thinking activity in some sort of inner 
intuition has nothing to hold on to, according to Kant, because its manifestations are ut-
40　 Ibid., 62.
41　 Ibid., emphasis added.
42　 As we mentioned in n. 13 above, the real target of Arendt’s criticism on this matter is Heidegger, not Kant.
43　 Ibid., 62-63. Arendt points out his use of Vernunfterkenntnis, “knowledge arising out of pure reason” is a 
contradiction in terms for him.
44　 Ibid., 41.
45　 Ibid., 42-43.
46　 Ibid.
47　 Ibid., 42-43.
48　 Ibid., 42-43.
49　 Ibid., 41.
50　 Ibid., 43.
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terly unlike ‘the appearance confronting external sense [which finds] something still and 
remaining...while time, the only form of inner intuition, has nothing permanent.’  Hence, 
‘I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I 
am.  This representation is a thought, not an intuition.’  And he adds in a footnote; ‘the ‘I 
think’ expresses the act of determining my existence.  Existence is already given thereby, 
but the mode in which I am…is not thereby given.’51
Arendt’s remarks are threefold in this section.  One: Though the inner sense might let us get 
hold of the thinking activity, the inner intuition itself does not have anything to get hold of. 
Two: The “I” of my consciousness, i.e., “that I am,” is a “representation” of a “thought,” not an 
intuition.  Three: Though the “I think” is said to express “the act of determining my existence,” 
that “existence,” i.e., the “I” of the “I think,” the mode how “I am” is not given in that act.  Arendt 
seems to think that to mention these remarks is sufficient proof for her claims; namely, that 
the “thinking ego is not the self” (to take that ego as the self is a metaphysical fallacy) and that 
“the thinking ego is Kant’s ‘thing in itself,” both of which are seen as “metaphysical fallacies.” 
In order to clarify her claims and intentions we require much closer examination.
　　There are two clues to clarifying Arendt’s claims that the “thinking ego is not the self” 
and “thinking ego is Kant’s thing in itself.”  First, by criticizing Kant’s notion of “thing in itself,” 
Arendt points out that the notion not only reduces appearance to mere representation, but 
that it also contradicts his own thesis in the first Critique:  “We assert that the conditions of 
the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judg-
ment.”52  Second, Arendt claims that his notion of “thing in itself” is derived from the reflection 
on one’s thinking activity, i.e., the “not-at-all ordinary experience of the thinking ego.”53  It is on 
these two points that Arendt claims that taking the thinking ego as the self is a “metaphysical 
fallacy” or, “semblance of reason” must be clarified.54  
　　Now, Kant’s notion of the “I think” is another name for intellect.  As Arendt points out, 
intellect as the act of thought is said to express the “act of determining my existence” accord-
ing to Kant.55  However, Arendt also suggests that the “I” of that “I think,” viz., “my existence,” 
which lies in my consciousness as “the unity of the I think” is not an intuition but a representa-
tion of thought.  When Arendt denounces that the “thinking ego is not the self,” she casts doubt 
on identifying the “I” of the “I think” as my “existence.”56  Our task is thus to analyze why Arendt 
claims that “existence” cannot be conceived as the “self,” and what she intends to establish by 
claiming this.
51　 Ibid., emphasis added.
52　 Ibid., 41.
53　 Ibid., 42.
54　 Ibid., 44.
55　 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S Pluhar & Patricia Kitcher (Hackett Publishing. 
Company, 1996), B 158. n. 296, emphasis added; hereafter abbreviated CPR.
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　　Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment can claim its objective validity because in it “the condi-
tions of the possibility of experience in general” and “the conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience” are unified; the conditions that make it possible for the object to appear. 
Though it is the pure concepts (categories) that combine the given manifold in judgment that 
makes the object presentable to us, without sensibility the pure concept is empty. We cannot 
cognize anything by pure concepts alone.  Our knowledge relies on sensible intuition.  In other 
words, in synthetic a priori judgment, the manifold given in intuition is combined with the 
concept (category), so that the apprehension of the representation of the object is possible.  
　　Now, though the “I think” forms the synthetic unity between the concept and intuition, 
the “I think” itself is a representation of the transcendental unity of apperception, or, self-
consciousness.57   It is that self-consciousness̶the unity of the “I”̶that makes the unity of 
the manifold given in intuition prior to its combination with thought.  
　　The crucial point in all of this is that Kant considers the synthetic unity of the manifold of 
intuitions to be the “basis of the identity itself of apperception.”58  This means that, without a 
synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, no judgment is possible, and since the synthesis 
of manifold given in intuition cannot be thought without one identical consciousness, the “I” 
as the unity, which makes up such consciousness, must “exist,” if thinking takes place.  Thus 
Kant posits, “I am, then conscious of the self as identical, as regards the manifold of the pre-
sentations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my (re)presentations 
that make up one (re)presentation.”59  Consequently, I can combine the given manifold with a 
concept.  That is why Kant says that the “I think” must be “capable of accompanying all my (re)
presentations.”60  Thus, when the “I think” is said to be a representation, which is synonymous 
with an act of spontaneity, it is in the self-consciousness that the “I” of the “I think” lies.   And 
it is solely on this point, from which Arendt’s contention that the “I” cannot be identified with 
the “self” but should be regarded as “thing in itself,” is derived.  Thus, we have to look into the 
nature of that “I” as a thought representation next.
Kant says about the “I” of the “I think” as following:
[T]he proposition I think precedes the experience that is to determine the object of per-
ception through the category in regard to time; and the existence is here not yet a cat-
egory.  The category of existence has reference not to an indeterminate given object, but 
56　 Kant writes, “We saw that in order for me to cognize an object different from myself, I not only require 
the thinking (which I have in the category) of an object as such, but do also require an intuition whereby 
I determine that universal concept. In the same way, in order to cognize myself too, I not only require the 
consciousness of myself or the fact that I think myself but require also an intuition of the manifold in me 
whereby I determine this thought.  And I exist as an intelligence.  This intelligence is conscious solely of its 
power of combination.” CPR, B 158-159. Emphasis added.
57　 Ibid., B 132.
58　 Ibid., B 134.
59　 Ibid., B 135, emphasis added.
60　 Ibid., B.132.
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only to an object of which one has a concept and concerning which one wants to know 
whether or not it is posited also outside of this concept.  An indeterminate perception 
here signifies only something real that has been given̶and given only for thought as 
such, and hence not as appearance nor as thing in itself (noumenon) but as something 
that in fact exists and is marked as such in the proposition I think.  For we must note that, 
when I called the proposition I think and an empirical proposition, I did not mean that 
the I in this proposition is an empirical (re)presentation.  Rather, this (re)presentation is 
purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought as such.61
　　As we have seen that the “I think” as the act of spontaneity, which is the understanding 
makes the synthesis between sensibility and the concept possible, it requires the manifold 
given in intuition for its act.  That is why Kant says that the “I think” is an “empirical propo-
sition.”  However, as we also have seen, the “I think,” is impossible without the unity of ap-
perception within which the one and the same “I” lies.  Though the proposition “I think” is 
an empirical one, the “I” of the “I think” itself is not an empirical representation but “purely 
intellectual” representation.62  It means that the “I” cannot be thought through the “category 
of existence,” for the “category of existence” is not a real predicate but the “copula of a judg-
ment.”63  By this concept “nothing further can be added” but it is only referring to the subject.64 
In other words, the subject must be determined, if something is judged through the “category 
of existence.”  It is used for a judgment when we have a “determinate concept and wish to 
determine whether there is an actual object answering to that concept.”65  But the “I” here 
is an “indeterminate given object” or, an “indeterminate perception.”  Furthermore, to think 
through categories means that the (thinking) subject̶the “I” of the “I think”̶must also be 
regarded as the object of categories.  However, the “I think” as judgment can use categories 
only if the manifold is given in sensible intuition, and such judgment is possible only where ap-
perception̶self-consciousness̶unifies the “I” as the same one thinking subject.  This means 
that the “I” is already presupposed in the “I think” as judgment.  In other words, without such 
presupposition of the existence of the thinking subject, the “I think” cannot function, though 
it is impossible to think the “existence” of the “I” of the “I think” through categories.  It means 
that the “I” of the “I think,” this “existence” never appears.  More precisely, it can be thought 
but cannot be cognized. 
　　Henry Allison comments on the “I” of the “I think” which echoes with Arendt’s claim. 
His point is that since the “I” cannot be thought through the “category of existence,” it is not 
able to be assigned to an individual thinker, and thus the “I think” cannot “issue in a genuine 
existential judgment.”66   The “I” of the “I think” never appears and remains anonymous, can-
61　 Kant, CPR, B 423, emphasis added.
62　 Or as Arendt quotes from CPR, B 157, “I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in 
myself, but only that I am.  This representation is a thought, not an intuition.”  See LM: I, 43.
63　 Ibid., B 598.
64　 Ibid.
65　 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (Yale University Press, 1983), 281.
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not be an “individual thinker,” and thus it is “without a life story” as Arendt points out.  The “I” 
is nobody, yet it is “not nothing.”67  The very anonymity of the thinking subject is what Arendt 
calls the “thinking ego.”  
　　Based on our analysis on the “I” of the “I think,” we need to turn now to our second 
question.  That is, we answer the question of determining what Arendt is trying to establish 
in claiming that “the thinking ego (existence) is not the self.”  From our analyses so far, what 
remains is an “indeterminate perception,” which is “something real̶given only for thought 
as such” or, what Arendt calls “not nothing.”  
　　Allison’s interpretation of the thinking ego as the “indeterminate perception” provides us 
a helpful insight as to what Arendt is trying to articulate.  He says that that “something real,” 
“something in general x”̶the “indeterminate perception”̶is the “transcendental subject of 
the thought.”68  He suggests two reasons why the “indeterminate perception” as the thinking 
subject can be understood as the “transcendental subject.  The first point is one that we have 
already discussed. That is, as the subject of apperception it cannot grasp itself as an object, 
for such attempt negates its character as a subject.  It is his second remark that is helpful for 
our inquiry.  He notes that “[A]s that through which alone there can be objects (whether of 
mere thought of experience), it must be thought as already on the scene, doing the concep-
tualizing.”69  Allison’s remarks capture the nature of the “I” in the “I think” as the nameless 
or anonymous knowing subject.  It cannot be known as the object of its own activity, yet it is 
already there in the thinking activity “doing the conceptualizing” while without that conceptu-
alizing activity it cannot be aware of itself.  He suggests Wittgenstein’s analogy to explain that 
relation between the thinking ego and its activity: “[J]ust as the eye cannot see itself because 
it is not part of its own visible field, so the subject of apperception cannot think itself as object 
because it is not itself part of its ‘conceptual field.”70  The “I” of the “I think” taken as the “self” 
though it is actually the thinking ego, is the very activity of “conceptualizing.”  Without the 
eye there is no “field of vision” in which the objects appear, but it is the act of seeing by the 
eye that forms that field.  Likewise, the thinking ego as the activity of conceptualizing forms 
the field of conceptualization.  
　　It is in this sense that Arendt is right to suggest that the thinking ego is Kant’s “thing in 
itself,” for through the viewpoint of that ego, thought does indeed look as if  it were “mere 
representation” of the thinking ego, viz., the concept as the product of the activity of conceptu-
alizing.  However, precisely because of that, the “thing in itself” is said to be one of the “meta-
physical fallacies” according to Arendt, for the thinking ego is “sheer activity” and not “self.”71 
Or, to take the thinking ego as the “self” is a “semblance of reason.”72  
　　It is in this respect that Arendt’s claim, that Kant’s distinction between Vernunft (reason) 
66　 Ibid.
67　Arendt. LM:I, 43.
68　 Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 292.
69　 Ibid.
70　 Ibid., 292-293.
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and Verstand (intellect) makes room not for faith but for thought, takes shape in the introduc-
tion of LM: I.73  We need to recall that Arendt indicated that the origin of the “metaphysical 
fallacies” is derived from equating the “meaning,” which is the quest of reason, with the model 
of “truth,” bequest of intellect.74  Arendt’s claim there was that Kant and his successors paid 
no attention to “thinking as an activity and even less to the experiences of thinking ego.”75 
Arendt’s claim in the section 6 of LM: I, the “thinking ego is not the self,” then, is her actual 
demonstration of what she has claimed at the very beginning of the same text.  That is, the 
“metaphysical fallacy” arises when philosophers demand the kind of certainty that we ex-
perience in our cognition from reason and the activity of thinking.  Arendt reveals why the 
“certainty” experienced in thinking activity is different of that of cognition.  Since the “I” itself 
is not an object of (determinative) judgment, the certainty of my existence is not derived from 
perception but from thinking activity.  To put it more strongly, what Arendt is doing here is to 
cast doubt on the basis of the validity derived from the certainty experienced by the thinking 
ego, or, “existence” as “purely intellectual representation.”  
　　Now let us recall the conditions that make possible the claim of the objective validity of 
Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment.  The objective validity of the synthetic a priori judgment 
can be claimed due to the conformity between the “conditions of the possibility of experience 
in general’ and the “conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience” according to 
Kant.76  The conformity of those conditions is particularly important in understanding Arendt’s 
contention here, for her contention challenges the conditions regarding to the nature of the 
“I.”  That is, since the objective validity of the synthetic a priori judgment is derived from 
the conformity between the “conditions of the possibility of experience in general” and the 
“conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience” for Kant, and since that synthesis is 
possible due to the unity of the “I” (one self-consciousness), the judgment, which confirms the 
existence of the apprehended (or perceived) object, also must refer back to the “existence” of 
the judging agent, viz., the thinking ego.77  Needless to say, the crucial point is that the condi-
tions, which make it possible for us to cognize, are also the conditions that make the object 
appear to us.  It means that the way we know of the existence of the object prescribes how 
things are to be. In other words, if our way of cognizing the object allows us to know that the 
71　 Arendt. LM: I, 44.
72　Ibid.
73　 Ibid., 14.
74　 Ibid.,15.
75　 Ibid.
76　 Kant. CPR., B.197.
77　 “Understanding̶speaking generally̶is the power of cognitions.  Cognitions consist in determinate 
reference of given (re)presentations to an object.  And an object is that in whose concept the manifold of a 
given intuition is united.  But all unification of (re)presentations requires that there be unity of consciousness 
in the synthesis of them.  Consequently the reference of (re)presentations to an object consists solely in 
this unity of consciousness, and hence so does their objective validity and consequently their becoming 
cognitions.  On this unity, consequently, rests the very possibility of the understanding.” Ibid., B 137.
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object exists, the same conditions should allow us to know our existence as well.  However, as 
we have argued above, “existence” (thinking ego) is an unknowable, non-appearing, anony-
mous “indeterminate perception.”  It means that there is a discrepancy between the criterion 
of the certainty of the “existence” of the thinking subject (ego) and that of the existence of 
the object.  Yet, as we have seen in Kant, the certainty of the “existence” (thinking ego) solely 
depends on the manifold given in intuition, even though that “existence” itself is unknowable. 
Consequently, it means either the objective validity of the synthetic a priori judgment is invalid or 
the account of the “existence” as knowing subject is invalid.  Denouncing the “I” of the “I think” 
as not being the “self” raises the question as to who is that judging agent to whom the existence 
of the apprehended object is supposed to refer back.  Putting it differently, by pointing out the 
“I” of the “I think”̶the “I” lying in self-consciousness̶is a “thought representation,” and by 
suggesting that Kant contradicts himself about the objective validity of the synthetic a priori 
judgment, Arendt questions the modern philosophical account of human existence, which is 
derived from reflection on the thinking activity.  
III.  Dismantling of metaphysics and Heidegger in LM I:§18
　　After going through a rather lengthy exposition of Arendt’s discussion in LM: I, 6 in the 
previous section, it is all the more striking when we take into consideration what we have 
learned about Arendt’s claims such as “Being and Appearing coincide” and appearance deter-
mines the “whole existence.”  On the one hand, by pointing out that to follow Kant in taking 
the “thinking ego as the self” is to commit a “metaphysical fallacy,” Arendt challenges the ac-
count of human existence given in the modern philosophical tradition by professional thinkers 
whose concern is primarily thinking.  At the same time, this denunciation contains her implicit 
intention to propose an alternative account of human existence based on her understanding of 
appearances.   
　　It is in Arendt’s discussion on the thinking dialogue in LM:I, 18, “The two-in-one,” that 
her intention becomes clearer in this regard.  It is in this section where we can find further 
evidence that Arendt’s dismantling of metaphysics is her attempt at dismantling thinking re-
flection and the “feeling of certainty” aroused in that reflection as the basis of the self.  Such 
dismantling is carried by contrasting the self (human existence) as an appearance.  
　　In LM: I, 18, “The two-in-one,” Arendt again takes up her analysis of thinking activity. 
Here, Arendt asks what the harmony that Socrates insisted on keeping within himself sug-
gests; her answer is that the harmony has been understood as a model of conscience in the 
philosophical tradition.  The harmony̶the thinking dialogue between me and myself̶is the 
reflection held in the thinking activity, which is the thinking ego analyzed previously.  Follow-
ing this claim, our immediate concern is to trace further her accounts of both the origin of the 
“metaphysical fallacy” and of the “self” based on appearances in her explanations of the nature 
of the thinking dialogue, viz., the “two-in-one.” 
　　At the same time, there is an equally important, if not greater, theme in this section that 
we must suggest.   This will help us to articulate Arendt’s overall intention of LM: I and its rela-
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tion to LKPP, noted at the beginning of this paper, namely, the issue that attending Eichmann’s 
provoked in her: determining the relation between the ability to think and to make a judgment. 
　　Let us first inquire into Arendt’s introduction of the issue of the harmony she found in 
Socrates.  Arendt quotes two examples from the dialogue, Gorgias.  First, “[i]t is better to be 
wronged than to do wrong.”78 Second, “[i]t would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I 
directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, and that multitudes of men should dis-
agree with me rather than that I, being one, should be out of harmony with myself and contra-
dict me.”79  Arendt argues that the first is a “subjective proposition.”  That is, what at stake here 
is not about being against the law of the city but being against for myself.80  Socrates’ position 
is not that of citizen but a person who is “chiefly devoted to thinking.”81  “If you are in love with 
wisdom and philosophizing,” then harmony between me and myself is required.82  If you do 
have harmonious relationship between you and yourself, then you prefer to suffer from some-
one’s wrong-doing than commit a wrong-doing by yourself.  It seems that a moral proposition 
arose “out of the thinking experience as such.”83  The “seeming” is one of our clues to analyze 
what Arendt is trying to accomplish in this chapter.    To reformulate it, the question is this: Is 
it really the case that the moral precept is based on thinking; or, in what sense can we say that 
thinking is a pre-requisite for moral feeling?  
　　In order to answer this question, Arendt sheds light on the nature of “being one” in the 
second proposition.  The “being one,” which indicates the harmonious relation between “me” 
and “myself,” is not merely one, but is constituted by two, for “nothing that is identical with 
itself, truly and absolutely one, as A is A, can be either in or out of harmony with itself.”84  It 
suggests that in the thinking dialogue the “I” is split into two, by which “difference” is intro-
duced in my Oneness.  The phrase “being one” means I am myself and for myself, and thus 
I am with myself, i.e., “a difference is inserted into my Oneness.”85  For Arendt, the decisive 
point lies the relation between “myself” and “for myself,” which is considered to form a “unity” 
in the thinking dialogue.  In order for us to say that the “I,” who is conscious of “myself,” and 
“for myself” are the “being one” forming a unity, we have to be able to say that the “I” and “for 
myself” are the same and different at the same time.  Thus, the nature of a difference “inserted 
into my Oneness” plays a key role in understanding the “I” as a unity, viz., “being one.”  The 
two-in-one, the unity of the I in “being one” is what we call consciousness.86  The question is 
78　 Arendt. LM: I, 181.
79　Ibid.
80　 Ibid., 181-182.  From the viewpoint of the common world, whether you commit a wrong-doing or you suffer 
from someone’s wrong-doing does not make any difference, according to Arendt.  “What counts is that the 
wrong had been done(.)”
81　 Ibid.,182.
82　 Ibid.
83　 Ibid.,183.
84　 Ibid.
85　 Ibid.
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where that inserted difference comes from, or if what is inserted is “difference” at all.  It is on 
those points that Arendt further proceeds to examine the relation between the self and think-
ing activity.  
　　We should pay close attention to the fact that in order for her to carry out her examination 
of the relation between the self and thinking activity, Arendt looks to Heidegger’s interpreta-
tion of Plato’s Sophist.87
The Stranger in the dialogue states that of two things̶for instance, rest and motion̶
‘each one is different [from the other], but itself for itself the same” (hekaston heautô tau-
ton).  In interpreting the sentence, Heidegger puts the emphasis on the dative, heautô, for 
Plato does not say, as we would expect, hekaston auto tauton, ‘each one itself [taken out of 
context] is the same,’ in the sense of the tautological A is A, where difference arises out 
of the plurality of things,  According to Heidegger, this dative means that ‘each thing itself 
is returned to itself, each itself is the same for itself [because it is] with itself…Sameness 
implies the relation of ‘with,’ that is a mediation, a connection, a synthesis; the unification 
into a unity.88 
Arendt explains that Heidegger’s interpretation comes from the part where he is examining 
Plato’s notion of the “community” of the Ideas, particularly that of Difference and Identity.89 
The opposite Ideas, e.g. “rest” and “motion,” are not different from each other in comparison 
of each other.  Rather each Idea is in itself and at the same time for itself by partaking the Idea 
of Difference insofar as they “refer back” to itself.90   The point Arendt tries to make in analyz-
ing Heidegger’s interpretation is that the “difference” does not come from outside (of itself) 
“but is inherent in every entity in the form of duality, from which comes unity as unification.”91 
In saying this, Arendt objects to Heidegger’s interpretation of the “difference.”
　　What is her objection? When I reflect on my own thinking activity, my thought becomes 
the object of my thinking, i.e., it becomes for me.  Even though Arendt herself does not differ-
entiate the terms, what she means is that when I reflect on my own knowing (cognitive) activi-
ty, my apprehension of the object, viz., the concept, becomes the object of my thinking activity. 
Her own example is the work of art.  A chair and the painting of that chair are not the same. 
Van Gogh’s apprehension of the chair he had in his room allows him to grasp the object as a 
chair, whereas his painting of the same chair doesn’t merely represent Van Gogh’s chair but 
has been transformed to reveal the “meaning” of the painting.  The work of art is the result of 
thought’s transformation, whose end is the meaning, i.e., a “thought thing.”92  The word “for” 
86　 Ibid.
87　 The text Arendt mentions here is Heidegger’s Identity and Difference (Martin Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh [The University of Chicago Press, 1969]).
88　 LM : I., 183-184, emphasis added.
89　 Ibid., 184.
90　 Ibid.
91　 Ibid., 184.
92　 Ibid.
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suggests that the object of cognition has gone through a transformation to prepare a “thought 
object,” so that the thinking activity can think about the meaning.  In other words, thinking
has taken possession of what was represented in the cognitive activity.93  Arendt writes, 
“[W] hat is being transformed here is the experience of the thinking ego to things themselves.”94
　　Arendt explains how thinking “takes possession” of the cognitive activity through the 
power of re-presentation, i.e., imagination.  The “thought object” is prepared by the twofold 
transformation of the imagination.  Imagination de-senses the given object, thus creates the 
“image” (or, representation) from which the thinking “goes even further” to prepare the 
“thought object” (or, concept).  The “thought object” is always physically “absent” and is “nev-
er present to sense experience.”  It comes into being “only when the mind actively and delib-
erately remembers, recollects and selects from the storehouse of memory whatever arouses 
its interest sufficiently to induce concentration.”95  From the viewpoint of the thinking ego, 
this experience of engaging with the “thought object” is as if the invisible Being,” which had 
been concealing, had come forward revealing itself “only to the mind.”96  Of course, that is an 
illusion or, a “metaphysical fallacy” according to Arendt, for even what is called “productive” 
imagination is entirely depend on the “reproductive” imagination.  
　　It is at this point that we can trace what Arendt has dealt with in LM: I, 6 is now re-intro-
duced in the discussion of LM: I, 18 (“The two-in-one”) and forms a thematic unity.  As we have 
demonstrated through our analyses of LM: I, 6, Arendt’s contention there was the issue of tak-
ing the thinking ego as the “self.”  The thinking ego̶the “I” of the “I think,” the non-appearing 
purely intellectual representation̶is considered to be the “existence” of the “self” or, the think-
ing subject, which is presupposed to reside in consciousness.  Without this presupposition, 
synthetic a priori judgment is impossible, since the “existence” of the “I” in consciousness is 
the sole reason why all representations are brought to me as my representations, which is the 
pre-requisite for the synthetic a priori judgment for Kant.  The “I” (the “existence” of myself) is 
the activity of “conceptualizing” without being itself conceptualized, thus it is the “I” that is the 
basis of all synthesis.  As the conceptualizing activity, the “I” is considered to be the concealed 
source of the forming field of conceptualization.  What Heidegger’s interpretation of the rela-
tion between the identity and difference in the Sophist offers is an explanation how the relation 
between the “self” (“existence”) and the concept forms a unity. It is in this relation between the 
“I” (“self”) and the concept that thinking is considered to form the synthesis between “myself” 
and “for myself.”  Arendt explicitly challenges such an understanding of the “I” in LM: I, 18 by 
suggesting that not only is the thinking ego not the self but also the “thought object” cannot be 
identified with that ego.  “[I]t is not the thinking activity that constitutes the unity, unifies the 
two-in-one; on the contrary, the two-in-one become One again when the outside world intrudes 
upon the thinker and cuts short the thinking process.  Then, when he is called by his name 
93　 Ibid., 185.
94　 Ibid.
95　 Ibid., 77.
96　 Ibid., 87-88.
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back into the world of appearances, where he is always One, it is as though the two into which 
the thinking process had split him clapped together again.”97  Arendt’s contention is that the 
thinking activity does not constitute the unity of the “self”, but, instead, the appearance of the 
particular individual person constitutes that unity.   
　　The “I” or the “self,” which makes conceptualization possible is actually a “sheer activity,” 
and that “sheer activity” is not the “self” but is the “thinking ego” according to Arendt.  Taking 
the sheer activity as the abiding “self” allows one to claim that the thinking activity forms the 
unity, for the unity, which the thinking offers, is derived from an illusory duality.  The duality, 
which is believed to form the unity in the thinking reflection, does not point out the synthetic 
unity between the concept and the intuition, which makes it possible for a person to perceive 
the object.  Rather, it points out the relation between the purely intellectual representation 
and the concept (“thought object”), i.e., the relation to something it is “not,” viz., the transcen-
dental object or, according to Allison’s interpretation, the transcendental subject.  It is in that 
relation that the Idea of God is said to be “for us.”  
　　In other words, what this duality does is to create a space in which the ego alone can 
exist.98  Even the duality, which can be termed as a “space,” is only a metaphor, since there is 
nothing permanent in the thinking ego as a sheer activity, and since the ego never appears in 
space nor is knowable as an object.  Thus, Arendt insists that taking the pure intellectual repre-
sentation as the “existence” of the (knowing) “self” is a “metaphysical fallacy,” for it contradicts 
the very conditions by which the objective validity of Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment is 
derived.  It seems that by interpreting the “I” lying in consciousness as the “existence” of the 
“self,” it becomes possible to claim that it is thinking activity that ultimately provides the basis 
for cognition and its objective validity.  But self-consciousness, in which the “I” is presupposed 
to “exist” as the abiding “self,” and by which alone Kant’s “I think” can function and claim its 
objective validity, merely points out the reflexive nature of thinking activity.  Arendt’s true 
intention regarding to dealing with thinking ego and the “self” in LM: I, 6 and 18 will become 
clear when we pay attention to Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant’s epistemology.
IV.  Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and Arendt’s critical response
　　The aim of the following is to offer a brief sketch of Arendt’s criticism of the claim that 
thinking activity forms a synthesis can be read as her critical response to Heidegger.  More 
precisely, what we have seen as Arendt’s “dismantling of metaphysics” in the section III of this 
paper can be understood as her criticism of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental imagination as manifested in his work, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.  In 
this final section, we will further articulate on this point.  As such, our purpose in this section 
97　 Ibid., 185.
98　 Ibid., 187.  “[T]his ego̶the I-am-I̶experienced difference in identity precisely when it is not related to the 
things that appear but only related to itself.”
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is to demonstrate that Arendt’s dismantling of thinking activity in the LM: I is her implicit criti-
cism of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s transcendental imagination as productive imagi-
nation in the Schematism.  
　　In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger interprets Kant’s first Critique as 
the laying the ground for metaphysics, or, what he means by a fundamental ontology.99  Hei-
degger’s main contention is that what are transcendental (a priori) conditions for Kant’s epis-
temology in CPR can be read as ontological knowledge.  Kant provides a theory of a priori 
conditions, which prescribe how the knowing subject and the object known are related to each 
other, and upon which the objective validity of human knowledge is revealed, along with its 
limitations.  In short, Kant rests the objective validity of his transcendental epistemology on 
the agreement of a set of conditions.  That is, “The conditions for the possibility of experience 
in general are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience.”100 
Heidegger, in his ontological interpretation on Kant’s epistemology, pays attention to the same 
set of conditions but specifically focuses on the “at the same time.”101  He suggests that, in or-
der for us as finite beings to know something, the object must appear to us, or, be for us.  What 
makes the act of experiencing possible is what at the same time makes the object able to be 
encountered by us possible, viz., it makes the object “experienceable.”102  It means that, since 
our way of knowing allows us to encounter the object, it is in our knowing activity that the con-
dition of the be-ing of the object is revealed.  As finite beings, our knowledge depends on the 
object that we did not create and the way in which we encounter that object.  In other words, 
Heidegger interprets the conditions of human knowledge as a way to form self-consciousness 
as the horizon of experience, and as such he proposes viewing self-consciousness as the Be-
ing of the self.  Ontological knowledge is not the knowledge of the object as such; rather, what 
Heidegger means is that self-consciousness, by which an object becomes experienceable for 
us, can be understood not only as knowing activity but also as the activity of the self, viz., the 
Being of the self.  In this context, knowing, for Heidegger, primarily means Being and what 
Kant means by “knowing” is mere thinking.103  In other words, for Heidegger “pure thinking” 
is ontological knowing, viz., ontological knowledge.104  And it is at this moment that Heidegger 
reverses Kant’s epistemology into ontological knowledge.  Thus, a pure synthesis means the 
formation of the horizon in which the correlation between the Being of the being and our way 
of knowing as finite beings is revealed.105  Heidegger calls this revelation “transcendence.” 
99　 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Indiana University Press, 
1991), 1, hereafter abbreviated as KPM.
100　 CPR. B 197, emphasis added.
101　 KPM, 84.
102　 “[W]hat makes an experiencing possible at the same time makes possible the experienceable, or rather 
experiencing [an experienceable] as such.  This means: transcendence makes the being in itself accessible 
to a finite creature.” Ibid.
103　 Ibid., 81.
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He transforms transcendental knowledge, which ascribes what we can know, into ontological 
knowledge, which reveals how these two sets of conditions are synthesized in a pure synthe-
sis, and consequently how such a synthesis reveals the Being of the self.  
　　At this point, we need to examine if there are parallels between Arendt’s “dismantling of 
metaphysics,” which we have dealt with in our previous section, and Heidegger’s ontological 
interpretation of Kant.  The first parallel that we can trace is between her understanding of 
the origin of the “metaphysical fallacy” and Heidegger’s account of knowing.  Arendt posits 
that the “metaphysical fallacy” arises by interpreting reason through the lens of the cognitive 
model (intellect).  It is derived from philosophers who blur the boundary between thinking 
(reason) and knowing (intellect) by “demanding the kind of results and applying the kind of 
criteria for certainty and evidence that are the results and the criteria of cognition” of think-
ing.106  In contrast, as mentioned above, through his interpretation Heidegger proposes that 
a pure synthesis forms the horizon of ontological knowledge.  It is in his ontological inter-
pretation that Heidegger redefines what the knowing activity is.  For that reason, Heidegger 
posits that truth is twofold: “the unveilingness of Being” and “the openness [Offenbarkeit] of 
beings.”107  Thus, he claims that “[i]f ontological knowledge unveils the horizon, then its truth 
lies precisely in [the act of] letting the beings be encountered within the horizon.”108  In other 
words, truth lies in “the act of” knowing, which means in the Being of the self, for Heidegger. 
It is not difficult to trace Heidegger’s account of truth and knowing in Arendt’s criticism on 
“metaphysical fallacy” in LM: I, for Heidegger’s knowing is really thinking.
　　It is here that we can suggest that the first parallelism lies between Heidegger’s account 
of knowing and truth and Arendt’s criticism of the “metaphysical fallacy” in her claim that it 
originates in equating the thinking activity (reason) with the cognitive activity (intellect).  What 
this all means is that if in fact Arendt’s “dismantling of metaphysics” is aimed at Heidegger’s 
ontology, evidence to support such a view must be traced in her discussions and remarks on 
the “metaphysical fallacy,” which can be understood as her criticism of Heidegger’s identifica-
tion of truth with Being.  
　　This leads us the second parallelism, which contrasts Heidegger’s account of the “self” in 
KPM to Arendt’s insistence that the thinking ego cannot be conceived as the “self” in LM: I. 
As mentioned in the first parallelism, what marks Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s episte-
mology is the analysis of the ontological implication of forming the horizon.  The crucial point 
for us is that Heidegger interprets the forming of the horizon as being an activity of thinking, 
104　 Ibid., 102.  Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant’s epistemology thus aims at revealing “ontological 
knowledge,” in which “knowing” (Kant) is taken as “thinking.”  Therefore, in the following analyses/
discussions, this paper displaces what Heidegger writes “knowing” to “thinking” in order for us to see that 
point within the context of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation.
105　Ibid., 86.
106　 LM: I, 13.
107　 KPM, 87.
108　 Ibid., emphasis added.
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which is equal to the Being of the self.  Before getting into detailed analysis, let us overview 
the locus of the issue in the second parallelism.  
　　Heidegger’s claim is that the synthesis of the transcendental imagination, viz., the syn-
thetic a priori judgment, which takes place in the Schematism, forms the horizon where a 
set of conditions for the objective validity of knowledge coincide.  Heidegger understands 
the forming horizon to be the integration of time in self-consciousness, in which an object is 
grasped as the determination of time.  It is in the synthesis of the transcendental imagination 
(i.e., in the activity of forming the horizon through the “I think”) that the “I” of the self is “nec-
essarily apparent,” according to Heidegger.109  He claims that both the “I think” and the “I” lie 
“in ‘pure self-consciousness,’” which “can only be elucidated based on the Being of the self.”110 
　　As an aside at this point, Arendt’s criticism – that taking the thinking ego to be the “self” 
is a “metaphysical fallacy” – can be understood as raising the question of whose activity is 
Heidegger’s thinking, really?  It asks that, if forming the horizon fulfills a set of conditions for 
establishing objective validity, then can we really say that that activity manifests the “I,” as 
Heidegger claims?  In short, Arendt’s criticism of taking the thinking ego to be the “self,” ad-
dressed against Heidegger’s account of the “self,” is tantamount to asking who is Heidegger’s 
“self.”
　　Returning to Heidegger, the pivotal point for his ontological interpretation is his equating 
Kant’s transcendental imagination with time, by seeing it as the common root of both under-
standing and intuition.  Ontological knowledge is a pure synthesis that forms the horizon and 
occurs in the Schematism in which intuition and understanding are unified.  Heidegger’s “self” 
is the horizon that integrates different tenses into one continuous time succession, viz., “Self”-
consciousness.  What makes it possible for  Heidegger to claim that this account of the “self” 
is valid is derived from his interpretation of Kant’s transcendental imagination as productive, 
as is articulated in §33 of KPM: The Inner Temporal Character of the Transcendental Power 
of Imagination.  Here, he articulates three different tenses̶present, past, and future̶as the 
three different modes of the pure synthesis of the imagination.  The first synthesis is “pure 
apprehension,” by which he means the pure synthesis of the manifold as an immediate grasp 
of the now or, “this-here.”111  It “produces̶the immediate look of the now as such.”112  The 
second one is “pure reproduction,” which designates the formation of the past; “it brings the 
horizon of the earlier into view and holds it open as such in advance.”113  The third one is “pure 
recognition,” which designates the future.  
　　All of this plays a central role for our current discussion.  Heidegger claims that “pure rec-
ognition” as a mode of synthesis of transcendental imagination is the synthesis of the “same-
ness” ahead of the previous two modes of synthesis, and thus is the ground for them.114 The 
109　 Ibid., 105.
110　Ibid.
111　 KPM, 125.
112　Ibid., 126.
113　 Ibid., 127.
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“sameness” is derived from the concept, or more precisely from the synthesis “in concept, for 
the concept is indeed the representing of the unity which as selfsame ‘applies to many.’”115  It 
is this mode of the pure synthesis of imagination (“pure recognition”) that allows the unity of 
“one consciousness,” since it is the synthesis in concept that “unifies the manifold.”116  
　　The third mode of the synthesis of transcendental imagination (“pure recognition”) has 
crucial importance here.  Heidegger’s position is that this synthesis is a synthesis in concept 
that is characterized by its “sameness” (i.e., universality).  Even though the first synthesis 
enables us to grasp the immediate presentation in intuition, without the aid of the concept it 
is a sheer mass of indeterminate impressions.  The key point is that the synthesis in concept 
comes ahead of the given manifold.  Pure concept as the articulation of the same is “already 
oriented in advance toward the being.”117   Heidegger interprets the characteristic of the third 
mode of synthesis as future-oriented: “It explores in advance and is ‘watching out for’ what 
must be held before us in advance as the same in order that the apprehending and reproducing 
synthesis in general can find a closed, circumscribed field of beings within which they can at-
tach to what they bring forth and encounter, so to speak, and take them in stride as beings.”118 
In other words, because of the third mode of synthesis of the transcendental imagination, the 
present and the past are unified into the one selfsame “self”-consciousness as one continuous 
time succession.  More importantly, though, this synthesis carries the sameness in advance, 
so that the returning synthesis of reproduction can attach to the same consciousness, which 
allows the apprehension.119  
　　From the viewpoint of the object, it means that the object becomes experienceable on that 
horizon, since the pure synthesis integrates the different modes of time into one continuous 
time sequence, i.e., the object that is to be for us.  However, from the viewpoint of subject, it 
means that through such a synthesis the unified “self” as “self-consciousness” is formed.  This, 
in turn, allows him to claim that the horizon is the “ground of the selfhood.”120  
　　Now, we need to examine the nature of the “self,” which is described as the Being of the 
“self” or “self”-consciousness by Heidegger in order for us to demonstrate that Arendt’s criti-
cism of taking the thinking ego to be the “self” is aimed at Heidegger’s ontological interpreta-
tion of Kant.  The issue at stake is the relation between Heidegger’s equation of the “I” and the 
“I think” with respect to forming the horizon.   
114　 Ibid., 130.
115　Ibid.
116　 Ibid.
117　Ibid.
118　Ibid., emphasis added.
119　 That is his answer for the question he raised: “[W]hen the mind again returns from its going-back into the 
past, when it returns again to the directly present being in order to set the former in unity with the latter, 
who then tells it that this being which is now present is the same as that which is previously abandoned, so 
to speak, with the fulfilLMent of the visualization?”  Ibid., 129.
120　Ibid., 134.
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　　As we have seen in §33 of KPM, to interpret the transcendental imagination as productive 
plays a pivotal role for Heidegger.  It is particularly important for our purposes that Heidegger 
assigns the synthesis in concept as exploring the horizon in advance by representing the 
sameness.121  That representing the sameness is the “I think,” which Heidegger understands 
as the regulative representation.  It proposes the “represented unities” in advance.  It means 
that Heidegger interprets the “I think” as a “pre-forming of the horizon of unity which repre-
sents ‘from out of itself.’”122  The “I think,” as a rule-giving representation, provides a framework 
for how the horizon should be formed.  The key here is that Heidegger says that rule-giving is 
“from out of itself,” and as such it is understood as “self-orienting toward....”  He writes, 
In such an orienting-toward..., or rather in the “self” which was ‘thrown out’ with it, the “I” 
of this “self” is necessarily apparent.  In this way, the “I propose” “accompanies” all repre-
senting.̶The “I” “goes with” in the pure self-orienting.  To the extent that it is itself only 
what it is in this “I think,” the essence of pure thinking as well as that of the I lies in “pure 
self-consciousness.”  This “consciousness” of the self, however, can only be elucidated 
based on the Being of the self(.)123
Forming the horizon as integrating the different tenses into one time is equal to forming “self”-
consciousness, according to Heidegger.  Through the “I think,” the rule of how the horizon 
should be formed is given.  Yet, “self”-consciousness’ relation to the rule is not passive, since 
the rule is given within itself or, “from out of itself.”  The very act, the “I think” itself, is consid-
ered to be the representation of the rule.  Whatever the “I” is, the “I” is taken as the origin of 
the rule whose representation is the “I think.” 
　　Nonetheless, Heidegger does not suggest that the “I think” is a mere representation of the 
“I.”  Rather, what he is suggesting is more like the split of the “I” that brings about the “I think.” 
More precisely, he suggests that the “I” and the “I think” form an identity, and it is in that iden-
tity that “self”-consciousness is formed.  Thus, when he claims that “self”-consciousness must 
be understood as the “Being of the self,” he means that the “self” as thinking activity per se  is 
understood as forming the identity out of the relation between the “I” and the “I think.”  In 
other words, Heidegger’s account of the “self” is established in the relation with itself.  He de-
rives his understanding of “self”-consciousness as the relation of the “I” with the “I think” from 
two different sources, though he claims that, in the end, they are the same: time and reason.  
　　Heidegger claims that both reason and time can be understood as “self”-affection.”124 In-
sofar as they are taken as coming out of the “self” and affecting the “self, the essential compo-
nents of Heidegger’s account of the “self,” they should be recognized as being the same.  Both 
of them provide the theoretical explanation why forming the horizon is the Being of the “self.” 
The difference between the two lies in the fact that Heidegger’s reading of reason claims that 
121　 Ibid., 130.
122　Ibid., 106, emphasis added.
123　 Ibid., 105, emphasis added.
124　For reason, see KPM, 111.  For time, see KPM, 133.
???
哲学・思想論集第四十五号
140
forming of the horizon (thinking) is the action (Being) of human being.  In its essence reason 
is the very foundation of human freedom for Heidegger.  
　　In Chapter 30 of KPM, Heidegger lays out “what and how” the “self,” which lies in the 
“self”-consciousness or the Being of the “self,” “manifest[s] itself by explicating the structure 
of the practical reason.”125  Heidegger posits that the moral I is the “authentic self.”126  The 
core of his argument for our purposes is that Heidegger pays attention to respect as the moral 
feeling, which functions as a “way of Being-self-conscious.”127  According to him, feeling is a 
“self-feeling of that which feels: “The manner in which self-feeling from time to time makes 
the self manifest, i.e., the manner in which it lets it be, will always be codetermined essentially 
through the character of that for which the feeling [being], in the self-feeling, has a feeling.”128 
In other words, Heidegger asserts that feeling is a way we feel ourselves, and thus that which 
“makes the self-manifest.”129  Following Kant, Heidegger says that respect is the moral feeling. 
Since feeling is “self-feeling of that which feels,” having a moral feeling suggests that feeling 
makes the law manifest.130  It in turn means that my having a feeling of respect for the law 
manifests the way I am.  Since “[e]verything which is possible through freedom is practical,” 
and “insofar as freedom belongs to the possibility of theoretical reason,” my having a moral 
feeling suggests that it manifests both myself and the law as the ground for my freedom, viz., 
action.131  Thus, not only in my moral feeling as the ground of my action (freedom) do the law 
and reason coincide, but myself and reason coincide.  It means that submitting myself to the 
law is the “self-affection” that is found in my feeling: “The submitting, self-projecting onto 
the entire basic possibility of what authentically exists, which the law gives, is the essence of 
the acting Being-itself, i.e., of practical reason.”132  The important point is that, by identifying 
reason as the foundation of authentic existence, the way one should be, Heidegger prepares his 
theoretical account as to why forming the horizon can be understood as “self”-consciousness, 
i.e., the Being of the self.  It means that by finding the coincidence between reason and the 
“self” in the moral feeling, Heidegger is able to provide his theoretical explanation as to why 
the “I think” as regulative representing is the rule-giving out of itself, and thus why forming 
the horizon is equal to forming the “self”-consciousness.   In other words, for Heidegger, form-
ing the horizon as the activity of thinking is the “manifestation of the self” through its action.
　　We should, at this point, recall our analysis of LM: I. 6, Thinking ego and the self: Kant 
from the third section of this paper.  There, our analysis was that the “I” of the “I think” was 
a thought representation, a pure intellectual representation, or, to use Arendt’s phrase, an 
125　 Ibid., 109, emphasis added.
126　Ibid., 110.
127　 Ibid.
128　 Ibid.
129　 Ibid.
130　 Ibid., 111.
131　 Ibid., 109.
132　 Ibid.
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“indeterminate perception.”  We mentioned there that Henry Allison understands this “in-
determinate perception” to be Kant’s transcendental object, without which there is no object 
to be experienced doing the conceptualizing thought itself that is not the object of such a 
conceptualization.  It is like the eye of the field of vision.  We argued there that Arendt’s con-
tention was that the “I” was not the “self” but a sheer activity, i.e., the thinking ego, since the 
“I” never appears and remains nameless, ageless, and anonymous, lacking a life story.  Most 
importantly, we need to recall Arendt’s insistence that taking the thinking ego to be the “self” 
contradicts the fulfillment of a set of conditions for objective validity in Kantian epistemology. 
　　It is clear that these points, as outlined in our analysis of Arendt’s criticism of taking the 
thinking ego to be the “self,” go against to Heidegger’s account of the “self.”  We have dem-
onstrated that, for Heidegger, forming the horizon is to make an object experienceable, and 
at the same time it can be understood as the activity of the “self” or, the Being of the “self.” 
He derives this ontological interpretation of the synthesis from Kant’s conditions for objective 
validity.  For Heidegger, the activity of thinking is possible not only when the “I” splits into the 
“I think,” but also in the two forms of identity.  It is the identity formed between the “I” and the 
“I think.”  It is the “I” that provides a specific standpoint ahead of which the horizon is formed. 
The “I” goes with the “I think”; in that way it is proposing, “self-orienting toward...”  But that 
“I” itself never appears in the way that objects do in the horizon, since the “I” lies in pure “self”-
consciousness, or, in the movement of forming the horizon.  In other words, the “I” becomes 
apparent in the way that Heidegger claims only because the “I think” gives the framework 
of the horizon through its being a regulative representing.  But the only way to trace “self-
orienting toward...” is when some object actually appears on the horizon, i.e., when that object 
is conceptualized.  It is through the conceptualization of the object that the “I think” makes the 
“I” apparent, but becoming apparent is not same as appearing.  So when Heidegger claims that 
the “I” of the “self” is necessarily apparent in the “I think,” what he really means is that the “I” 
is apparent to the eye of the mind, since he understands the “self” as an activity, not as a being. 
If the “I” of the “self” as activity or, more precisely as that of knowing becomes apparent in the 
“I think,” that is so because of a mental inspection of such activity, viz., thinking.   
　　Thus, when Arendt points out that the thinking ego is a “sheer activity” in LM: I. 6, what 
she means is not the knowing activity (i.e., judgment), but thinking activity.  It is in this sugges-
tion that we can see an implicit criticism toward Heidegger’s “self” as the Being of the “self.” 
Furthermore, in her claim that the thinking ego exists only in a duality created in the thinking 
reflection, we can recognize the relation between the “I” and the “I think” in Heidegger’s ac-
count of the “self.”  These points lead us of her discussion of the origin of conscience in self-
consciousness in LM: I. 18, “the two-in-one,” in which she takes up Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Plato’s Sophist.    
　　Let us recall that the issue at stake for Arendt in Heidegger’s reading of Sophist is his 
claim that thinking forms the unity, or, synthesis.  Arendt inquires into how Heidegger comes 
up with the notion of identity.  
The Stranger in the dialogue states that of two things̶for instance, rest and motion̶
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‘each one is different [from the other], but itself for itself the same” (hekaston heautô tau-
ton).  In interpreting the sentence, Heidegger puts the emphasis on the dative, heautô, for 
Plato does not say, as we would expect, hekaston auto tauton, ‘each one itself [taken out of 
context] is the same,’ in the sense of the tautological A is A, where difference arises out 
of the plurality of things,  According to Heidegger, this dative means that ‘each thing itself 
is returned to itself, each itself is the same for itself [because it is] with itself...Sameness 
implies the relation of ‘with,’ that is a mediation, a connection, a synthesis; the unification 
into a unity.133 
With his emphasis on “with,” Heidegger claims an identity is established between the itself 
and “for itself.”  Yet, Arendt finds Heidegger’s reading erroneous, for there is no “difference” 
in the relation between itself and “for itself,” as he claims.  Rather, she points out, what Hei-
degger claims as being an “identity” between the two is actually a “relation to something it is 
not.”134  The “not” signifies the thinking ego’s relation to itself, according to Arendt.135  Our 
concern here is to ask by pointing out that the “not” signifies the thinking ego, what Arendt 
really means.  If we pay close attention, the issue at stake for Arendt is Heidegger’s interpreta-
tion of the horizon as “self”-consciousness, or more precisely as correlatum.136   
　　Horizon is understood as correlatum, since it correlates subject and object as the horizon 
of experience, and as such horizon is not something or, not a being according to Heidegger. 
Rather, Heidegger identifies the correlatum or horizon, with object in general x, viz., Kant’s 
transcendental object, since though it is not a being without it there is no experience pos-
sible for us and at the same time there is no object experienceable.  It is the thinking activity 
itself, which as we’ve seen, is the Being of the “self” for Heidegger.  Heidegger also calls this 
correlatum, “nothing.”137  Meanwhile, the transcendental object immediately reminds us of 
the fact that Arendt claims that Kant’s thinking ego is the transcendental object as a purely 
intellectual representation, the non-appearing I engaging in conceptualizing, whose character-
istic we traced in the role of the “I” in forming the horizon in Heidegger.  As far as Arendt’s 
criticism on Heidegger’s account of identity is concerned, we can see that what she is arguing 
here is indeed the relation between the “I” and the “I think” in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant’s transcendental deduction.  Heidegger understands “self”-consciousness as horizon or, 
correlatum, which he identifies with transcendental object.  For him, transcendental object 
is the Being of the “self,” the thinking activity as such in ontological sense.  Whereas Arendt 
criticizes such interpretation that what Heidegger takes as “self”-activity̶knowing̶is actu-
ally thinking activity.  Thinking activity cannot be taken as the self but is thinking ego, since it 
does not appear at all. 
　　In her criticism on Heidegger’s reading of Sophist regarding to his account of “identity,” 
133　 LM: I, 183-184, emphasis added.
134　Ibid., 184.
135　 Ibid., 187.
136　 KPM, 86.
137　 Ibid.
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we can see that Arendt is challenging his understanding of “self”-consciousness as the horizon 
for experienceablity of object and the Being of the “self.”  In response to his claim, Arendt ar-
gues to the contrary, that “consciousness is not the same as thinking,” for the act of conscious-
ness is “intentional” and thus “cognitive act” whereas thinking activity is “dialectical.”138  Ac-
cording to Arendt, Heidegger’s way to claim identity is erroneous and invalid, since it merely 
suggests the relation between the “I” and the “I think,” or, reason and application of rules as 
regulative representing are the same.  That is to say with Arendt’s words, in such a relation, 
“that is, in its identity, reveal no difference, no otherness; along with its relation to something 
it is not, it loses its reality.”
　　We must recall that in her discussion of the intentionality of appearances, Arendt reaf-
firms that the nature of intentionality is that “[w]hatever appears is meant to for a perceiver, 
a potential subject no less inherent in all objectivity than a potential object is inherent in the 
subjectivity of every intentional act.”139  She simply means that in the intentional act both sub-
jectivity and objectivity are built-in.  The crucial point is that she claims that the certainty of 
one’s perceptions rests upon others’ acknowledgement that the same object is also perceived 
by them, it becomes clear that her position does indeed differ greatly from his.140  
　　Her remark suggests that in order for us to understand an object, it is not enough to ap-
ply universality or the concept to it.  Putting it differently, Arendt suggests that, if perception 
means to apprehend an object, this apprehension is not derived from deduction.  It in turn 
means that she objects to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Schematism as forming a schema-
image.  A schema-image is produced by a look that sees from a specific standpoint.  But what 
determines that standpoint is the rules, what Heidegger calls pure understanding.  As long 
as a look originates from the same universal viewpoint, intentionality as perception does not 
require others’ acknowledgement, as Arendt points out.  In other words, Heidegger’s under-
standing of “intention” and consequently his account of the apprehension of object leaves no 
room for the existence of others.  But if that is the case, how we know who we are, or even if we 
exist?  Thus, Arendt insists that without acknowledgement by others, “we would not even be 
able to put faith in the way we appear to ourselves.”141 
　　Based on our series of analyses on the two major parallelisms between Arendt and Hei-
degger comparing Arendt’s LM: I and Heidegger’s KPM, it is now clear that the issue at stake 
for Arendt was Heidegger’s account of the “self,” which is so enclosed in its activity, viz., think-
ing.  As we have delineated its characteristics, the unity of the “self” in Heidegger is derived 
from the “self-affective” movement of the thinking activity; the split of the “thinking ego” (the 
I) and the “I think” whose existence neither appears nor is a part of the world of appearances 
through the eyes of Arendt.  When Heidegger interprets Kant’s epistemology ontologically, 
he commits a “metaphysical fallacy.”  Heidegger’s account of the “self” and its existence are 
138　Arendt. LM: I, 187.
139　Ibid., 46.
140　 Ibid.
141　 Ibid.
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entirely singular.  For Arendt, it is hardly possible to lay the ground of morality, which is con-
ditioned by such understanding of thinking as to Heidegger.  In the end, there is not a human 
being but human beings exist on this earth.  The infinite plurality is “the law on the earth.”142
　　Now, it is clear why Arendt needs to dismantle metaphysics, which in turn really means 
to confront with Heidegger’s account of human existence and thinking.  In her process of such 
deconstruction, Arendt seeks to articulate the moral/ethical ground in thinking which reflects 
the fact that human existence is fundamentally embedded in plurality.  
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